OPINION BY MUNDY, J.:
Appellant, Zaid Shabazz, appeals from the order entered April 5, 2010 by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying his petition for writ of certiorari to the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, following his conviction and sentencing for driving under the influence of a controlled substance. Appellant alleges the Municipal Court erred in denying of his pretrial suppression motion. We affirm.
We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history as contained in the certified record as follows. On November 28, 2008, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Officer Mustaff Beyah of the Philadelphia Police Department observed Appellant driving south on 63rd Street in Philadelphia, noting objects hanging from the inside central rearview mirror. Officer Beyah and his partner initiated a traffic stop for suspected violation of the provision of the Vehicle Code prohibiting driving while objects materially obstruct the driver's view. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(c). As a result of the stop, the police issued a traffic citation for violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(a).
On June 18, 2009, the Municipal Court of Philadelphia held a hearing on Appellant's pretrial application for relief, seeking suppression of all physical evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop on the grounds that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to perform the stop. N.T., 6/18/09, at 4. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1005 (establishing procedure for pretrial relief, including suppression of evidence, before Philadelphia Municipal Courts). At the conclusion of the hearing, Municipal Court Judge Thomas Nocella, denied Appellant's pretrial application for relief but granted a defense motion for recusal. N.T., 6/18/09, at 23-24. On November 18, 2009, Municipal Court Judge Bradley K. Moss, in a stipulated trial, found Appellant guilty of DUI. On February 3, 2010, Appellant was sentenced to a term of confinement of 72 hours to six months plus fine and costs. Certified Record (C.R.) at D1.
Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1006(1)(a) and 1008, Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, seeking review of Judge Nocella's denial of Appellant's suppression motion. C.R. at D3. Upon review of the Municipal Court record, Judge Frank Palumbo denied the writ of certiorari on April 5, 2010. Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court on April 12, 2010. C.R. at D4. Appellant filed a timely concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on April 29, 2010, and Judge Palumbo file a Rule 1925(a) opinion on June 10, 2010. C.R. at D6, D7.
Appellant raises a single issue for our review.
Appellant's Brief at 3.
Appellant maintains the traffic stop initiated by the police officers was an investigatory stop unsupported by reasonable suspicion that a violation of section 4524(c) of the Motor Vehicle Code had occurred. Specifically, Appellant asserts that "the items hanging from [A]ppellant's rearview mirror, foam dice and air fresheners, could not be reasonably suspected of materially obstructing [A]ppellant's vision through his windshield." Appellant's Brief at 9.
We observe the following standard guiding our review.
Commonwealth v. Dixon, 997 A.2d 368, 372-373 (Pa.Super.2010) (en banc), quoting Commonwealth v. Thompson, 604 Pa. 198, 985 A.2d 928, 931 (2009) (internal quotes and citations omitted). "The issue of what quantum of cause a police officer must possess in order to conduct a vehicle stop based on a possible violation of the Motor Vehicle Code is a question of law, over which our scope of review is plenary
The Vehicle Code permits a police officer to initiate a traffic stop when he or she possesses reasonable suspicion that a section of the Code has been or is being violated.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308. The Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing the validity of the stop. "Thus, under the present version of Section 6308(b), in order to establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which led him to reasonably suspect a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. . . ." Holmes, supra at 95-96 (emphasis in original).
Instantly, at the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth sought to establish through testimony of the arresting officer that the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to believe Appellant was in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(c) at the time of the traffic stop. The statute provides as follows.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(c).
This Court has applied the foregoing principles to traffic stops premised on perceived violations of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(c). In Commonwealth v. Benton, 440 Pa.Super. 441, 655 A.2d 1030 (1995), we held a stop to be illegal where the officer did not present reasonable and articulable grounds for suspecting a violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(c). In that case, the officer professed a belief that it was illegal to hang any object from a rearview mirror and provided no testimony that he was aware of the size or nature of the object at the time of the stop or how it materially impaired visibility through the windshield. Id. at 1034. Accord, Commonwealth v. Felty, 443 Pa.Super. 559, 662 A.2d 1102 (1995).
In support of his argument, Appellant cites our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Anthony, 1 A.3d 914 (Pa.Super.2010), and characterizes our holding therein as follows. "Concluding that the officer had seen `merely a gaggle of the ubiquitous pine-tree shaped air fresheners commonly marketed for use in automobiles,' this Court held that the stop was unlawful because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe the objects materially obstructed the defendant's view." Appellant's Brief at 9, quoting Id. at 921.
Appellant misconstrues our holding in Anthony. Our conclusion in that case was premised, as in Benton, on the officer's lack of an articulable and particularized description of the objects he observed hanging from the rearview mirror, and the impact of those objects on the visibility through the windshield.
Our Supreme Court has still more recently affirmed these principles in Holmes, supra, wherein the Court emphasized that the requirement that the police express specific and articulable facts in support of their suspicion is critical to enable the reviewing court to perform an independent assessment of the reasonableness of that suspicion.
Holmes, supra at 96 (citations omitted). "[I]n order to establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must articulate specific facts in addition to inferences based on those facts, to support his belief that criminal activity was afoot." Id. at 97 (emphasis in original).
Thus, the facts must be testified to in support of the reasonableness of the officer's suspicion occasioned by his or her pre-stop observations.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 99.
Turning to the facts of the instant case, we note that Appellant does not argue that Officer Beyah, in his testimony, failed to
N.T., 6/18/08, at 7-9.
Based on this record, Judge Palumbo acting as a reviewing court, held as follows. "The combination of multiple air fresheners, three by three inch foam dice, and Officer Beyah's explanation of how these items might impair a driver's view made it reasonable for him to suspect the [A]ppellant was in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524(a) [sic], and justified the traffic stop." Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/10, at 4. We agree.
Unlike the police officers' testimony in Benton, Anthony and Holmes, Officer Beyah testified specifically about the size and nature of the objects he observed hanging from the rearview mirror. He also testified about his inferences regarding the impact those items would have on a driver's ability to safely see through the windshield while driving. We conclude that the information was sufficient for the Municipal Court, and later the Court of Common Pleas, to independently evaluate whether Officer Beyah had reasonable suspicion to
We conclude that the record supports the Court of Common Pleas' factual findings and legal conclusions in denying Appellant's petition for writ of certiorari, and therefore we affirm the order denying relief.
Order affirmed.